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ABSTRACT
A review of historical and recent theories of the eti-
ology of infantile autism is presented. A cognitive-de-
velopmental approach is especially described, and serves as
the viewpoint of the study itself. The issue of value of
diagnosis is raised, and a focus on cognitive skills empha-
sized. Subjects are 68 psychotic children whose case his-
tories were drawn from the treatment files of the Putnam
Children's Center in Boston. Thirty-three are diagnosed as
autistic, 35 as childhood schizophrenic. The central hypo-
thesis is that outcome will be better predicted by cognitive
functioning tested by the Stanford-Binet in preschool years
than by diagnosis arrived at during the same period. This
hypothesis is tested for all 68 subjects against outcome in
latency. A smaller number of these subjests were also used
for tests of outcome in adolescence and adulthood. In fact
both diagnosis and cognitive performance were found to be
significant predictors of outcome, leading to a recommenda-
tion to use both evaluative procedures in making plans for
children with these handicaps.
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INTRODUCTION
This study focuses on extreme behavior deviation of
preschool children. The data are drawn from the case rec-
ords of a pioneering center for the treatment of deviant
preschoolers, the James Jackson Putnam Children's Center in
Boston, Massachusetts. The children under consideration have
been diagnosed as psychotic. Half fulfill criteria for the
diagnosis of infantile autism; half are diagnosable as child-
hood schizophrenics.
A brief history of the identification of these two syn-
dromes and their differentiation from others and from one
another are offered. More detailed history of theories of
autism are presented, since the differentiation to be made
is often to decide whether or not to consider a child psycho-
tic, and then whether to further identify him as suffering
from infantile autism.
The premise of this study is that this diagnostic ef-
fort is misplaced in prognostication, and that in fact the
child's level of cognitive development, regardless of general
symptomatology, is a better Indicator of outcome than is
diagnosis which takes into account affective considerations
or interpersonal relatedness. Studies are reviewed which
focused on cognitive aspects of infantile autism, some of
which contain outcome data.
The thesis tested in this study rests, then, upon a de-
velopmental conception of behavioral problems in the pre-
school years and emphasizes the skills possessed by the child
and the incapacitating lack of skills. During the period
when the data was being accumulated at the Putnam Center, the
Stanford-Binet test was used as a standard stimulus for the
assessment of these skills. Careful observation of the
child's behavior in the testing situation augmented the rote
scoring of the test.
REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE
Historical Overview
Severe behavioral disturbances specific to very early
childhood have been recognized only within the past three
generations. Earlier, children's problems were seen only as
very early manifestations of adult syndromes. For example,
"mental retardation" was seen as a defect which prevented
those affected from being able to perform salaried labor,
and was diagnosed in children only as educators attempted
to differentiate those who could profitably learn a trade
from those who could not. Childhood schizophrenia was first
called "dementia praecoxissima, " as though it were adult
schizophrenia occurring exceptionally early in life (Kanner,
1973). In recent years these disorders of early childhood
have been increasingly differentiated from one another. This
differentiation has probably been both the result and the
cause of a finer appreciation of the details of preschool
development, which has enabled professionals to evaluate the
behavior of children against ever-more-detailed norms and
has produced a parental generation far more sensitive to
the viscissitudes of infant development than has existed
heretofore
.
The identification of several psychoses of organic ori-
gin afflicting children, remarkable achievements in identify-
ing preconditions which lead to various forms of mental re-
tardation, and the recognition of severe disturbances without
yet identified organic determinants have been the fruits of
this growth of understanding, m many cases, clear identi-
fication of a syndrome and its preconditions has led to pro-
grams which promise to free children from the scourge of
handicap. For example, screening for phenylketonuria (PKU)
is now routinely done in much of the country, and identified
children, through special diets, are prevented from develop-
ing the intellectual handicaps which formerly were the common
result of that syndrome. Early intervention in cases of
deafness and blindness have helped children with these handi-
caps to reach a higher level of cognitive and social develop-
ment than was possible in earlier times (Praiberg, 1968,
1971; Praiberg, Smith, & Edelson, 1969; Marx, 1974).
There are psychoses for which no physical cause has yet
been found: infantile autism, symbiotic psychosis, and
childhood schizophrenia (as described by Rimland, 1964).
These may be genuinely functional psychoses, the result of
genetic defect
,
or affective and cognitive handicaps
. They may
be entirely separate syndromes or varying degrees of the same
syndrome. Indeed, they have been differentiated from the
mass of other problems of preschool years chiefly by virtue
of advances in identifying the etiological factors of the
others. This is probably because cognitive, perceptual, and
affective development in young children are so closely inter-
dependent that extreme disruptions of one must cause diffi-
1
culties of development in the others. Therefore, similar-
seeming lags in development may be caused by quite dissimilar
precursors.
Infantile autism is an especially puzzling syndrome.
The children appear bright and physically healthy. They oft-
en show isolated skills at least appropriate to their age
level, sometimes beyond. Yet they fail to develop effective
communication, are unrelated to their environment and espec-
ially to the adults in it, and seem unmotivated to perform
many behaviors felt to be natural to young children. Since
social, emotional, and intellectual development lags further
and further behind, deterioriation of functioning is progres-
sive, and the prognosis for recovery is very grave.
Four Perspectives on Infantile Autism
Autism, a psychopathological state in which appealing-
looking young children seem to be bewitched into non-human
creatures, has been of interest to adherents of almost every
psychological system. The condition serves as a challenge
to theories of human behavior, as the negative case which a
theory should be able to reconcile with its constructs of
normal behavior. Psychoanalysts, behaviorists
,
genetic and
neurologic psychiatrists, and cognitive-developmental psy-
chologists, as well as ethological biologists have all ap-
plied their understanding of the behavior of human beings to
the problem of explaining autistic behavior. Each system em-
phasizes particular aspects of the totality of behavior.
The analysts
.
The psychoanalysts are concerned with
energy flow and motivation, which is certainly a key problem
for the autistic child, who does not seem attracted to other
people, does not learn by imitation, and who spends much time
in repetitive and often destructive behaviors. Dr. Bruno
Bettleheim has spent his professional life working with very
disturbed young children and has contributed importantly to
research on autism. He has been caricatured as one who
blames the parents for the fact that autistic children seem
to have withdrawn their libidinal investment from the world
and focused it on themselves. In treatment he tries to pro-
vide a gratifying environment which revives hope in the child
that the world outside himself is worthy of exploration.
However, Dr. Bettleheim' s approach does not deserve the sim-
ple-minded construction attributed to him by his detractors.
In The Empty Fortress
, for example, he attempts to make use
of cognitive and developmental theory and to relate how the
mind works (cognitive development) with why it learns the
things it does when it does (motivation) . Another psychoana-
lyst, Selma Praiberg, has addressed herself to the same pro-
blem of inter-relationship by studying blind children's de-
velopment and identifying the conditions of early development
which help the blind child to avoid becoming autistic (which
is a serious hazard for the blind-from-birth child).
Behaviorism . This psychological school of thought sets
aside the issue of internal motivation, to focus on what is
done. Ivar Lovaas (1966) has devoted himself to the treat-
ment of autistic children and has demonstrated that they can
be taught to perform activities formerly shunned, if the en-
vironmental contingencies are properly manipulated. He has
even succeeded in supporting the use of word-sounds in chil-
dren who have not developed language. Unfortunately, motiva-
tion is not so easily banished from the system; behaviorally-
oriented therapists have not yet taught autistic children to
link words together in new, complex, self-motivated sequences,
making the behavior functionally useful in a less well-con-
trolled environment. At the Lynnwood School in Maryland, be-
havioral analysis of interactions coupled with a development-
al and somewhat psychodynamic orientation has enabled an in-
tuitively skillful therapist to explain and generalize her
mode of treatment (Simmons, 197*0 . Jean Simmons, the thera-
pist, and Dr. Charles Perster, the behavioral psychologist,
enjoyed a fruitful period of collaboration while they were
working out this translation of developmentally into behav-
iorally-based procedures (Ferster & Simmons, 1966). The col-
laboration ended, however, when the behaviorist attempted to
extend his model by the use of teaching machines and other
environmental changes which seemed to the developmentalist in
conflict with her overall system of treatment (Simmons, 19 69 )
.
The biological approach . This approach to autism is best
represented by Bernard Rimland, author of Infantile Autism .
In this monograph he reviews in a most comprehensive way the
8literature in the field to date of publication (1964). He
offers a hypothesis which links autism and childhood schizo-
phrenia as defects of different parts of the central nervous
system. Rimland's work, brilliant as it is in surveying the
field and producing a creative and plausible hypothesis, has
resulted in only one treatment proposal, the use of megavita-
mins, which has not yet produced the desired reduction in
symptomatology
.
The developmental approach
. Child development has con-
tributed to the psycho-education of autistic children. Pro-
gress in understanding and guiding the development of young
normal children has been made as finer understanding of the
developmental processes has been obtained by the careful
study of normal children. Knowing just what children are
capable of at given stages of development enables educators
to design curricula which promote growth without posing frus-
tratingly insoluble problems for the child. Recognizing that
children understand the world differently from adults enables
parents of normal children (especially if they have read Frai-
berg's The Magic Years ) to deal sympathetically with the
strange fantasies and misconceptions of young children.
Understanding the cognitive processes of very disturbed
children may similarly lead to better handling of these chil-
dren. The intuitive sensitivity of those who work with the
autistic, for example, leads them to avoid streams of verbiage
which seem like an attack upon these youngsters. Metaphors
—
The Sel^e (Park, 1972) and The_ Emp_ty_ Fortres^ (Bettleheim,
1967)—communicate the feelings of sensitive people trying to
penetrate this seeming shell. While much has been written
about the autistic child, few empirical studies have dealt
with how he thinks and attempted to relate this to how he be-
haves and how he develops or fails to develop.
Recent Cognitively Oriented Studies of the Autistic
A few empirical studies have had as variables the level
of verbal development, various performances of manipulative
and gross physical skills, and diagnostic category. Often
the number of subjects is quite low, the range of ages is
quite broad, and the diagnostic criteria are poorly defined.
In a search of the outstanding journal of this field, Jour -
nal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia
, the following
studies were found which seemed relevant to the approach to
childhood psychosis being discussed in this study.
Treffert, McAndrew, and Dreifuerst (1973) reported on
the outcomes of 57 psychotic children treated in an in-patient
program over 11 years. Associated with positive outcome they
found: late onset of the problem, the development of speech,
and completion of bowel and bladder training at the time of
admission. It is not clear if "speech" means communicative
speech or merely recognizable vocalizations. The autistic
children (criteria for diagnosis not made clear) tended to
remain chronically hospitalized when compared with cases of
later onset.
DeMeyer, Barton, and Norton (1972) evaluated the intel-
lectual, verbal, motor, perceptual-motor, and perceptual task
performance levels of preschool psychotic children and a
matched group of mentally sub-normal children. They found
that the retarded children were more advanced than the schi-
zophrenic children in only two motor tasks, but better than
the "primary autistics" in all except the Seguin formboard
and stair climbing. No comparative outcome data were pro-
vided.
In another study, DeMeyer, Barton, DeMeyer, Norton, Al-
len, and Steele (1973) reported that the best predictor of
functional capacity in a work-school setting of autistic
children was the child's overall prognosis at intake. Per-
formance I.Q. and the overall severity of illness were the
next best indicators. They contrast their findings with
those of Rutter (1967) and concluded that speech and overall
I.Q. were the best predictors of outcome.
In an ingeniously-designed study, Hermelin (1972)
studied blind, autistic, deaf, and normal children (half of
the normal children were blindfolded) to determine whether
normal and variously-handicapped children used different
modalities to locate events in space and time. Her conclu-
sion is worth quoting, since the language she uses helps to
make clear the differences of cognitive conceptualization from
earlier generalizations about mutism, withdrawal, etc.:
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What is relevant in this context is not so much a
verbal incapacity [on the part of autistics] as a
discinclination to use words as "tokens" spontane-
ously in a coding operation .... The main point
made in this paper is that it is an oversimplifica-
tion to assume an overall abnormal structure of
sensory channels, which, for instance, leads to a
dominance of touch over vision. As shown [by these
findings] when visual information is codable for
autistic children, they use visually-presented ver-
bal stimuli like deaf children, presumably because,
like the deaf, they do not spontaneously translate
and rehearse the items in a verbal form (p. 297).
Three Viewpoints of Diagnosis
Leo Kanner (19^3), in his original paper identifying in-
fantile autism, offered as one of the criteria for the diag-
nosis that they "do not have language which conveys meaning
to others." He ventured to distinguish infantile autism from
the already identified childhood schizophrenia as a distinct
syndrome rather than a subtype, on the basis of the parents'
reports that their children had always been detached, remote,
and uncommunicative with other human beings, whereas childhood
schizophrenia had been seen as a regressive disorder which
followed a period of "normal" growth. Kanner f s (19^9) cri-
teria for diagnosing autism are:
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1. Profound withdrawal of contact from people
2. Obsessive desire for the preservation of same-
ness
3. Skillful relation to objects
4. Retention of intelligent and pensive physiog-
nomy
5. Mutism or the kind of language that does not
seem intended to serve the purpose of inter-
personal communication
In their report on research being conducted ».t the Putnam
Children's Center, Brown and Kaplan (197*0 use these criteria
to construct a codifiable system of diagnosis. For each of
the five criteria, a given child can be given a score of +3
if the criterion is highly characteristic of the child, +1 if
it is somewhat characteristic, or -2 if the criterion is not
characteristic. Each child being evaluated can receive a to-
tal Kanner Autism Score ranging from -10 (not autistic) to
+15 (highly autistic).
Rimland (1964) offered the hypothesis that both infan-
tile autism and childhood schizophrenia are disorders of the
ascending reticular formation. In autism the reticular for-
mation is supposed to be resistant to conducting impulses,
resulting in sensory deprivation, while in schizophrenia the
system is thought to be too responsive, resulting in flooding
of the sensorium. He predicted, as a consequence, that au-
tistic thought will be characterized by obsessive integra-
tion, while schizophrenic thought will be seen as dissoci-
ated. Rimland included in his understanding of the meaning
of childhood schizophrenia that it becomes manifest later in
childhood than does autism, after a period of apparently nor-
mal growth, and that it is usually accompanied by visual or
auditory hallucinations in later childhood. His diagnostic
tool is an 80-item behavioral checklist, Form E-2 (1964, pp.
219-236). Brown and Kaplan (1974) used Form E-2 to diagnose
cases of childhood schizophrenia.
The James Jackson Putnam Children ' s Center
, which was
founded in 19^3 in Boston, Massachusetts, has specialized
since that time in the study and treatment of infants and
preschoolers, focusing on both normal psychological develop-
ment and on the various psychological problems which may be
manifested in the early years. As contemporaries of Leo Kan-
ner, the directors—Dr. Marian Putnam and Mrs. Beata Rank
—
>
were interested in his work with children whom he identified
as having infantile autism. Developing the primary diagnos-
tic center for very young emotionally-disturbed children in
the Metropolitan Boston area, they saw most of the children
within a large radius of the city who manifested the symptoms
described by Dr. Kanner. They also saw many children with
detectable brain damage (whom they referred elsewhere for
care), cases of childhood schizophrenia of very early onset
(thought by Loretta Bender and others to be suffering from
subtle brain damage), cases as described by Margaret Mahler
(1952) with a primitive symbiotic tie to mother, and children
with diverse other behavioral difficulties—fire setting,
cruelty to animals, stuttering, irrational fears, etc.
Rank and Putnam's system focused on the adequacy of the
child's ego integration. They paralleled the development of
Anna Freud's concept of developmental lines in their own in-
dependently constructed theoretical formulations. Applying
this system, they identified children who might be diagnosed
by others as either autistic, symbiotic, or schizophrenic to
be suffering from different degrees of atypical development
of ego functions, characterized by fragmentation of the ego.
All children so identified were referred to at the Center by
the short-hand label "atypicals , " or even colloquially,
"Atyps." All such cases, whether seen further in treatment
or seen only for diagnosis, were considered study cases and
were followed carefully by the Center staff through phone
and letter contacts, periodic follow-up evaluations, reports
from schools and other institutions, unless the parents of
the child were absolutely unwilling to cooperate.
These three diagnostic systems, Kanner's identifying
autism, Rimland's identifying childhood schizophrenia, and
Rank and Putnam's which blurs distinctions between these two
categories while focusing on specific ego-functions or skills
and the dispersal of developmental levels within the given
child subject will be used in the experimental procedures of
15
this study.
Rationale of This Study
The history just reviewed shows a progression of thought
about developmental disturbances in very young children. The
first approximation applied to labels from adult deviance
translated into those for childhood. During this period,
dementia praecoxissima was the diagnosis given very dis-
turbed young children. Dementia was the problem, whether oc-
curring in childhood, late adolescence, after the birth of a
child, or in old age. Later, the fact of early onset was
recognized as also a problem in that early onset of a handi-
cap interferes with development as well as with day-to-day
functioning. Kanner's (19^9) position was that, because it
is a schizophrenia with such insidiously early onset, autism
is a syndrome which is distinguishable from other schizo-
phrenias. More recently, researchers have been interested in
differentiating childhood schizophrenia from autism on the
basis of the differences in cognitive functioning manifested
by these children. Rimland (1964) has done this because of
his hypotheses about etiology. Bettleheim (1967) has done so
as a contribution to the attempted integration of ego-psycho-
logy and Piaget-inspired developmental studies of cognition.
The present study axso focuses on differences in cogni-
tive functioning, but for other reasons. The important ques-
tions to this researcher are:
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1. What are the skills the child presently has upon which
to build a behavioral repertoire with which he can deal
with the world?
2. What can be done to augment these skills so that his
handicap will be minimized?
3. What will be the outcomes with and without interven-
tions?
In this study the classifications "childhood schizophre-
nia" and "infantile autism" will be used. A hypothesis to be
tested will be: given that all the children under considera-
tion are deviant in the way usually considered psychotic,
they can be meaningfullly differentiated from one another on
the basis of cognitive performance as measured by tradition-
ally-accepted intelligence tests. Furthermore, this mode of
differentiation will also be a useful prognostic indicator.
Rank and Putnam's focus on "ego-functions" is partially re-
tained in this study with its emphasis on cognitive perform-
ance, and their blurring of diagnostic lines (for which they
were chided by Dr. Kanner as introducing a meaningless waste-
basket category of "atypical") is endorsed. "Ego-functions"
in this study are somewhat narrower than those considered by
Rank and Putnam, being limited to purely cognitive skills
rather than the whole system of intellectual and ego-defen-
sive abilities.
17
METHOD
Subjects
Data on subjects were drawn from the study of children
with atypical development at the James Jackson Putnam Chil-
dren's Center. Prom 1 9 4 3 to 1968, 350 cases were diagnosed
and most have been successfully followed up. The mass of
material pertaining to these cases is in its clinical form:
reports of diagnostic evaluation sessions, process notes of
social-work and psychiatric sessions, descriptions of the
child's behavior in the therapeutic nursery, follow-up phone
calls, etc. Dr. Janet Brown has been supervising the codifi-
cation of these files into processable data on over 450 vari-
ables. Two hundred cases have so far been coded and follow-
up to the present time. This pool of coded cases serves as
the source from which the subjects for the present study were
drawn
.
The information within the files permitted Brown's team
to evaluate the children on the basis of commonly-agreed-upon
criteria for diagnosis. Rimland's (1964) Form E-2 (see Appen
dix) was rated for each child by the raters, using the file
as the source of information. Reliability checks were made
by having two raters go through the same file independently.
The raters were found to differ little or not at all in their
independent ratings. (No exact reliability figures are
given.
)
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In some instances, E-2 was also rated for the child by
his own parents. Six children whose E-2' 8 were rated by
their parents (in the total sample described by Brown and
Kaplan) scored above Rimland's cutoff for early infantile
autism, although only one of the total sample which was
rater-rated received this high a score. It would seem, then,
that the parents
»
rating was different and that raters (using
the information available to them) underestimated the sever-
ity of the condition. Since this study depends upon the
rater-rated E-2's, some children with severe childhood schi-
zophrenia who might have been included in the sample if par-
ent-rated E-2's were available may have been omitted from the
study. Those who are included probably are those with the
most severe diagnoses, reflecting the bias of the rater-
rated protocols toward lessening the recognized level of
diagnosis.
Children were given a code on the basis of the Rimland
E-2 of from one (low or no indices of schizophrenia) to nine
(highest index of schizophrenia). Children with coded scores
of seven, eight, and nine were considered potential subjects
for this study, and their case numbers were noted.
It was also possible to rate the children in the pool on
their level of autism, according to Kanner's (19^9) criteria
for early infantile autism. This rating was summarized by a
total Early Infantile Autism score ranging from a code of one
(low autism) to nine (high autism). Children scoring seven,
eight, and nine on the Autism Scale were selected as poten-
tial subjects for this study, and their case numbers noted.
This criterion cut-off guaranteed that each chosen as autis-
tic must have positive indications on all five of Kanner's
criteria for autism.
Since Rimland's criteria were used to select the schi-
zophrenic subjects, and Kanner's to select the autistic sub-
jects, it was possible for children to score within the cri-
teria on both high schizophrenia and high autism. In fact
some children did turn up in both subject groups. These
children were excluded as subjects.
The protocols for all remaining potential subjects were
then scanned to ascertain whether there was evidence of brain
damage or sensory impairment. Almost all the children in the
sample had been assessed neurologically by Mary Louise
Scholl, M.D. at Massachusetts General Hospital. Dr. Scholl
has specialized in the neurological assessment of very young
children and conducted research in this field for many years.
Besides the usual scanning of the nervous system, checking
the reflexes and the responses dependent on each major nerve
pathway, she also conducted behavioral examinations which
overlapped with the psychological examinations conducted at
the Putnam Center. Waking and often sleeping E.E.G.'s were
given to many of the children. Notation was made in each
child's chart of any positive hard signs of neurological im-
pairment, soft signs (that is, responses suggestive of im-
pairment but not conclusively so, or not consistently elicit-
ed), or of sensory impairments detected. Children with any
of these complicating factors were excluded from the subject
pool
.
The coded protocols contained evidence of the extent to
which formal psychological testing had been done. If this
evidence showed that nothing could be concluded concerning
the child's intellectual development, the child was also ex-
cluded from the subject group. When all of these exclusions
had been made, there remained 35 "schizophrenic" children and
33 "autistic" children to serve as subjects for this research
Measures
All of the children included in the sample had been
evaluated by a psychologist before the age of five. In al-
most every case the psychologist was Mrs. Grace Young, a mem-
ber of the American Board of Examiners of Professional Psy-
chologists, who was associated with the Center -from its be-
ginning until her retirement in the early 1970' s. Mrs. Young
used the Stanford Binet as a testing instrument and also as
a standardized experience against which she could compare the
behaviors of the many young disturbed children which he ex-
amined during her career.
. . .
the difficulty experienced by the Chief Psy-
chologist, Mrs. Grace Young, in obtaining valid
21
measures 0 f Intellectual functioning on the Stanford
Binet because of the inability of the children to
cooperate, led to the use of the psychological ex-
amination as a vehicle for qualitative observation
rather than quantitative assessment (Brown & Kaplan,
1974, p. 6).
This qualitative use of the Binet over many years, by the
same examiner, under the very same experimental conditions,
and with the shrewd observations and careful reporting
which Mrs. Young made, have resulted in a ma;s of quantifi-
able data, which are the source of the particular data to be
examined in this study. A sample report of one of Mrs.
Young's evaluations is appended. Although this is a demon-
stration evaluation of a child who was not a patient at the
Center, it was conducted in the same manner as were the study
evaluations, in the same room, and with a child of appro-
priate age. Of note is the wealth of information under "Im-
pressions," which conveys vivid images of the child and his
response to the testing situation. Also, note that under
"Findings" a potentially scoreable protocol for the Stanford
Binet is included. And under "Summary" the observations and
findings have been integrated into a qualitative understand-
ing of the child's cognitive function as it has been affected
by his emotional reactions. The psychological evaluations of
the children in the study, central to which is a Stanford
Binet test for each child, will constitute one set of mea-
sures In this study.
All of the children in the sample have been followed by
the Center staff at least until the age of ten, and many be-
yond. For all subjects, information is available which per-
mits an evaluation of their functioning in the real world.
Page 57 of the appended Etiology and Prognosis In Childhood
Psychosis Rating Scale shows the 11 categories of outcome
which the Putnam Center raters used to code the information
available to them. This information is arranged in a contin-
uum from good outcome to very poor outcome, with intellect-
ual, social, and intrapsychic behaviors considered simultan-
eously in assigning a child to a given category. One aspect
of this system of categorization which makes its use inappro-
priate in the present study is that it separates qualitative
categories (for example eruptive and passive) into different
levels within the continuum as though they could be ordered.
For example, passive retarded mild (category five) is numeri-
cally weighted as more favorable than eruptive retarded mild
(six) if the categories are considered ordered. Since this
researcher is not prepared to defend the differences in level
between these two qualitative categories, the categories for
this study will be collapsed as shown in Table One. These
Insert Table One about here
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Table
Outcome Categories
as Derived from Categories
Brown and Kaplan Categories
1. Normal-neurotic
2. Brittle-schizoid
3. Eruptive-schizoid
4. Schizophrenic
5. Passive-retarded, mild
6. Eruptive-retarded, 1 mild
7. Passive-retarded, moderate
8. Eruptive-retarded, moderate
9. Passive-retarded, severe
10. Eruptive-retarded, severe
11. Regressed-arrested
1
for This Study,
Used by Brown and Kaplan
Categories for This Study
1. Functioning at age level
2. Dull to normal
3. Mildly retarded
4. Moderately retarded
5. Severely retarded
6. Profoundly retarded
Brown and Kaplan, 197^, p. 17
data will constitute the secondwic o o a set oi measures for this
study.
gummar7 measures. The independent variables were
diagnosis (autistic or schizophrenic) and cognitive skill
level. The levels of these were determined by information
from the Center files, using Rimland's Form E-2 and Kanner's
five criteria. Those with the highest levels of childhood
schizophrenia as measured by Form E-2, and the highest levels
of autism as determined by Kanner's criteria were chosen as
subjects
.
Cognitive skill was determined by rating the protocols
of tests on the subjects at five years of age or earlier, us-
ing the Stanford Binet. Ten categories of cognitive skill
were used, so that a total cognitive skill score ranges from
a potential of zero to ten.
Outcome at three different age levels served as the de-
pendent variables. These data were drawn from the Center
files and coded (for this study) from an outcome of one
(functioning, at age level) to six (profoundly retarded).
Checks on rater reliability were made by having two
raters rate the same file independently, but exact procedures
and outcome for this reliability check are not available.
Procedure
Although the children under study were not testable in
the conventional sense, and therefore numerical data on their
performance on the Stanford Binet cannot be assembled for
each child on each item on the test, the rich descriptive
material in the psychological evaluations can be used to make
a qualitative evaluation of each child's functioning in a
number of cognitive skill areas tapped by the test. The sys-
tem used by Brown (Etiology and Pronosis in Childhood Psycho-
sis Rating Scale, p. H 5 ) used to codify the child's ability
to demonstrate his competence in nine cognitive areas, as
tested by the Stanford Binet:
li Fine motor skill alone.
2. Simple perception.
3. Rote memory, perceptual.
4. Perceptual analysis and synthesis.
5. Perceptual reasoning and expressive language.
6. Receptive language and perception.
7. Expressive language and perception.
8. Rote memory, verbal.
9. Receptive and expressive language, reasoning.
This system of schematizing the cognitive areas tapped by
the Binet was developed by Brown, and depends on face valid-
ity.
Each child's protocol was examined to determine whether
there is demonstration of competence on any one of the sub-
tests for the skill being evaluated. For example, a protocol
which shows ability to do bead-stringing to the criterion re-
quired to pass the item on the Binet was scored Plus (+) for
1. Fine motor skill alone
. A child who showed no performance
to criterion required to pass on any subtest was scored Min-
us (-). For example, a child who did not do either the form
board, Seguin, mare and foal, animal pictures, or discrimina-
tion of forms was scored Minus on 2. Simple perception
. Ex-
ception would be made for the child who demonstrated compet-
ence on advanced tests (i.e., perceptual analysis and synthe-
sis, receptive language and perception) and who was not test-
ed at the two or three year level merely because these tests
were clearly beneath his functioning level. Such a child
would be given a Plus for competencies which can only be
tested by the Binet at a low level, when they demonstrate
competencies at a higher level which are a synthesis of sev-
eral simpler competencies. In actual practice, this excep-
tion affects only the scoring of competencies One and Two,
which are tested by very simple tasks, omitted for the very
bright and/or older preschooler.
Treatment of the Data
The hypothesis to be tested is that performance on the
Stanford Binet is more predictive of outcome in later child-
hood and adulthood than is diagnostic category predictive of
outcome
.
Independent variables . 1) Diagnosis constitutes one
independent variable. High Rimland Schizophrenic subjects
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compose one group, and High Kanner Autistic subjects compose
the other group.
2) Cognitive skills is the second independent variable.
The same subjects for whom diagnosis is used for categoriza-
tion in the first test are re-categorized by their perform-
ance on the Stanford Binet for the second test into High and
Low Cognitive Skill Groups.
Dependent variable. Each of the independent variables
is used separately in a test of the dependent variable, out-
come. Outcome measures are available for all of the children
in the sample at latency (ages six to eleven), many at ado-
lescence (ages 12-19), and some in adulthood (20 and beyond).
Separate analyses are made comparing outcome for children as
predicted by diagnosis and cognitive skill at each of these
age levels.
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RESULTS
Definition of "Good" and "Poor" Cognitive Performance Groups
In order to establish a basis for assigning subjects to
sample groups on the basis of cognitive performance, the to-
tal pool of subjects was treated as one group. The distribu-
tion of all subjects' cognitive scores is established. Table
Two shows the distribution of scores for the latency age
Insert Table Two about here
group. The median is calculated to be 2.7. In keeping with
accepted practice (Seigel, 1956) all scores below the median
were counted in one group, and all scores above the median
in the other. Therefore, Cognitive Scores of 0, 1, and 2 are
counted as "Poor" scores, and those of 3 through 9 as "Good."
The median cognitive score was calculated for the adolescent
group, using the same data on cognitive performance as was
used in calculating the latency figure. The re-calculation
was done to develop a true median cognitive score for only
those subjects for whom adolescent outcome data were avail-
able. This median was also 2.7, and so the same categories
for cognitive groups were used. However, the adult outcome
data were available on a smaller group, and losses were so
distributed that the median for this group on cognitive
skills was quite different: 4.13. For the adult outcome
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Table 2
Distribution of Scores on Preschool Cognitive Performance
Score
0
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
Frequency
9
7
13
7
i|
7
5
2
4
10
Total = 68
Median = 2.7
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test only, the Good Cognitive Performance Group is composed
of those having cognitive scores of 5 through 9, and the Poor
Cognitive Performance Group is composed of those with scores
from 0 to 4.
Examination of the categories of tasks upon which these
scores are based reveals that a child must perform some ver-
bal operations beyond rote repetition in order to achieve a
place in the Good Cognitive Performance Group. Those chil-
dren who are in the Poor Cognitive Performance group either
showed no testable competence at all (score of zero) or per-
formed only the simple perceptual or simple motor tasks.
Typically, this would mean solving the Seguin form board or
managing to string a few beads on a shoelace. The children
who are in the "Good" group solved problems requiring expres-
sive language, complex reasoning, good memory, and complex
perception and analysis. Among this sample were some excep-
tionally bright children who performed in their preschool
years tasks which are considered difficult for elementary
school children.
Definition of "Good " and " Poor " Outcome Groups
The median outcome for the total sample pool at each of
three age levels (latency, adolescence, and adulthood) was
calculated. In each case, half the subjects fell in category
one, "normal" functioning. Half fell in the remaining cate-
gories of less than normal functioning. Good outcome subjects,
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then, are those whose outcome is one; poor outcome subjects
are all others. Table Three shows the distribution of out-
Insert Table Three about here
come scores for all three age levels. Note that the latency
group has the largest number of subjects, adolescence next,
and adulthood the smallest number, reflecting the fact that
some of the children being followed had not reached these
older categories at the time of data collection.
Analysis
.
The median test was used, since the data are
ordered but not interval data. The chi-square distribution
with one degree of freedom was used to determine the level of
significance (Siegel, 1956).
Outcome as a Function of Diagnosis and of Cognitive Skills
on Latency
.
All 68 subjects, 33 Autistics and 35 Schizophrenics were
grouped according to outcome. Table Four shows the distribu-
Insert Table Four about here
tion of good and poor cognitive skills between the two out-
come groups. Low cognitive scorers had significantly poorer
outcomes in latency than did high cognitive scorers (chi
square = 15.22; £ < .001).
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Table 3
Distribution of Outcomes
in Latency, Adolescence, and Adulthood
Outcome Level
4
Frequency
Latency Adolescence Adulthood
1 29 27
2 8 8
13
5
3 854
5 12 9
6
_2 3
9 7 3
5
o
Total 68 59 30
Median 1.6 1.3 1>0
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Table k
Distribution of Outcome in Latency
by Cognitive Performance in Preschool
Good Outcome
(level 1)
Low Cognitive
Score 2|
(0 - 2)
High Cognitive
Score 25
(3 - 9)
Poor Outcome
(levels 2-6)
25
All subjects were also grouped according to diagnosis
and their outcomes charted. These data are presented in
Table Five. The schizophrenic group had significantly more
Insert Table Five about here
subjects with good outcome than did the autistic group (chi
square = 7. 5 , p_ < . 01)
.
Outcome as_ a Function of Diagnosis and of Cognitive Skills
,
Adolescence
Table 6 shows the distribution of outcome by cognitive
Insert Table Six about here
function for the subjects for whom outcome data were avail-
able in adolescence. There were 59 subjects in this pool.
Again, more subjects with high cognitive scores were in the
good outcome group (chi square = 3.4, p_ < .05). Table 7
Insert Table Seven about here
shows outcome at adolescence by diagnosis. No significant
differences in outcome were found (chi square = 3.1, £ <
.10).
Table 5
Distribution of Outcome in Latency by Diagnosis
Good Outcome P0Or Outcome
< level 1) (levels 2 - 6)
Autistic 8 25
Schizophrenic 21 14
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Table 6
Distribution of Outcome
in Adolescence by Cognitive Performance
Good Outcome Po0r Outcome
(level D (levels 2-6)
Low
Cognitive 7 y.
Score
High
Cognitive 20
Score
15
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Table 7
Distribution of Outcome
in Adolescence by Diagnosis
Good Outcome p00r Outcome
(level D (levels 2-6)
Autistic 10 29
Schizophrenic 17 13
a Function of Diagnosis and of Cognitive Skills
,
Adulthood
Table 8 shows the distribution of outcome by cognitive
Insert Table Eight about here
function for the subjects for whom outcome data were avail-
able in adulthood. There were 30 subjects in this pool.
Cognitive score was not related to outcome in adulthood (chi
square = .62, p_ > .10). Table 9 shows that diagnosis was re
Insert Table Nine about here
lated to adult outcome. Again, the schizophrenic group had
significantly more subjects with good outcome in adulthood
(chi square = 5.^3, p_ < .02).
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Table 8
Distribution of Outcome
in Adulthood by Cognitive Performance
Good Outcome p00r Outcome
(level 1) (levels 2-6)
Low
Cognitive l\ 10
Score
High
Cognitive
Score
9 7
Ho
Table 9
Distribution of Outcome
in Adulthood by Diagnosis
Autistic
Schizophrenic
Good Outcome Po0r Outcome
(level 1) (levels 2-6)
11
11 6
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DISCUSSION
Limitations of the Data and of the Study
The opportunity to analyze data concerning the function-
ing in their preschool years and outcome in late childhood of
over 60 very disturbed young children with no detectabl
neurological or sensory handicaps is rare. The fact that 200
potential cases had to be screened in order that these 68
were located testifies to the difficulty of isolating a sam-
ple of this size and with the quality of information avail-
able about the subjects. The data sample represents the work
of hundreds of professional workers over 30 years of work in
an outstanding metropolitan treatment and research facility.
However, with this historical and professional richness of
information must come limitations to the validity, reliabil-
ity, and applicability of the information considered within
this study.
Validity of the measures
. The diagnoses of the children
as to their being Kanner-autistic or Rimland-schizophrenic
rests in most cases on a complex data-gathering and evaluat-
ing process. The children were all interviewed by psychia-
trists, psychologists, or by trainees under close supervision
in each of these fields, and the observations of these inter-
views recorded as process notes which were included in the
children's case records. The parents were interviewed by
psychiatric social workers or supervised social work trainees
k2
who recorded the developmental histories of the children and
the parents' reports of current behavior and family child-
care practices. Process recording of these interviews were
also kept. The determination of the extent to which a child
exhibited behaviors listed by Kanner as autistic or how his
behavior should be rated on Rimland's Checklist E-2 was gen-
erally made by a rater who examined only the case records and
who did not observe the child or interview his parents. Since
the case-material was quite rich, it was possible for the
raters to glean considerable data from the files. However,
in those instances where parents themselves also filled out
Rimland's E-2, the reports were found to differ from the
blind rater-made checklist for the child. The psychologist
who supervised the raters verified that the parents' use of
the checklist resulted in a more accurate portrayal of their
child than was the report of the rater. Therefore, the as-
signment of children to one diagnostic group or the other is
of challengeable validity. Errors could have been made in
the reporting of data by the child and parent interviewees,
or they could have failed to gather crucial data, or the
raters may have misinterpreted data accurately reported.
The evaluation of cognitive functioning of the children
was also made on the basis of written reports made by the
testing psychologist. The difficulty of assessing the intel-
lectual functioning of any preschool child is well known, and
all problems of valid assessment are magnified in the case of
the very disturbed preschooler. A sample of the raw data
from which a determination of a child's intellectual func-
tioning was made is included in the appendix. While it is
vividly descriptive, it is not quantitative. Inferences of
a quantitative kind were made by attempting to note which of
nine categories of intellectual behavior-if any-were demon-
strated by the child in the standardized experience of being
exposed to the Stanford-Binet test. These nine categories
were developed by examination of the skills needed to solve
the Binet tasks. They have face validity, but it is not
known to what extent they measure the traits so named, or
whether they are "pure" intellectual functions, or whether
there are better ways to measure these same intellectual
functions
.
The children have no detected neurological or sensory
impairments. The evaluations of neurologic competence were
done by an outstanding specialist in the field, using clini-
cal judgment as well as standard examination of reflexive
and voluntary behavior and electro-encephalography
. Adequacy
of vision, hearing, touch, etc. were validated by the child's
physician or a specialist if there were any question about
sensory competence. However, the neurological and sensory
assessment of very young children, and especially of children
who do not communicate up to age level is extremely diffi-
cult. The validity of the complete exclusion of impaired
children is open to question.
The follow-up data is represented by a unitary figure,
but this summarizes reports of parents, teachers, psycho-
educators, and/or psychotherapists about the child's func-
tioning. Intelligence test scores, placement in school
grade or institutional setting, social interaction, and
psycho-emotional functioning are considered together. This
broad assessment of functioning is represented in our data as
a continuum, and argument can be made that it is a continuum
of adequacy of coping with the world. However, quantitative
and qualitative aspects may be inextricably merged. For
example, a very bright child who has learned to manipulate
words and symbols, but who is very poor at interpersonal
relationships would probably be rated higher on this contin-
uum than would a better-relating but not very intelligent
child. Intelligence (which relates to one of the dependent
variables in this study) is thus a factor in the measurement
of outcome (the independent variable). Moreover, it is a
factor which cannot be quantified within the independent
variable, so that one cannot say with certainty how much its
effects are seen in the outcome. To some extent, then, the
uncertain validity of the outcome measures contributes to
circularity of the study itself. Outcome has proved to be a
quite stable variable over time, however. No child in Brown
and Kaplan's study has varied more than one of their 11 lev-
els in outcome, from latency to adulthood.
Reliability of the measures . The reliability of the
45
ratings made upon which the diagnostic category assignments
were made is not known. The criteria are carefully spelled
out in the Etiology and Prognosis in Childhood Psychosis
Rating Scale which the raters used to codify the data in
the files. A check made of rater reliability in the use of
this instrument showed good inter-rater reliability.
The reliability of the data bearing on cognitive develop,
ment rests primarily on the fact that the same instrument was
used by (in most instances) the same examiner, in the same
testing room over many years. However, this source of reli-
ability could also be a source of consistent bias. Another
examiner might have used different probes to elicit behavior
from the child, might have chosen to introduce test items not
used by Mrs. Young because she assumed they were beyond the
child or for some other reason.
The interpretation of the examination findings and the
quantifying into the nine cognitive categories used was done
by one rater (the author of the study) without cross-checking
by another rater. Data for a rough check of reliability is
available, in that the Putnam Center raters made note of the
"strongest area" of cognitive functioning, using the same
categories. Comparison of "strongest area" on that coding
form for each subject with the areas checked for each sub-
ject on the raw data forms for this study could at least re-
veal if the researcher missed the subject's best area of
functioning in her overall assessment. Protection of con-
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fidentiality of the records makes independent rater reliabil-
ity checking difficult at this time.
Applicability of the study
. The Stanford-Binet was a
very sophisticated instrument in the early forties, when
gathering of the data was begun at the Putnam Center. Con-
tinued use of that instrument has yielded a consistent body
of data, for which this researcher is very grateful. However,
the Stanford-Binet has been replaced as an evaluative tool by
more sensitive, easier to score, more recently standardized,
and more broadly standardized instruments in most clinical
practices. A researcher or practitioner who would like to
make use of the findings of this study in evaluating psychotic
preschool children might, for example, prefer to use the
Weschler Preschool and Primary Test of Intelligence. In that
case, the categories used in this study would have to be re-
vised to suit the skills and tasks involved in that test. As
is always the case in using a psychological evaluation in-
strument, a trained and skilled examiner is needed. But
evaluation of psychotic preschoolers requires specialized
training beyond that which develops competence to test the
usual clinic population. Personal qualities of patience,
sensitivity, tolerance for bizarre behavior, and interperson-
al skill which a well-trained psychologist will not neces-
sarily have are called for.
Similarly, while Kanner's critieria for diagnosis of
autism and Rimland's checklist for childhood schizophrenia
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are straightforward to apply, they do depend on a sophisti-
cated practitioner's interpretation. The conclusions to be
discussed concerning this study depend upon the careful def-
inition of the terms used. We are talking about "autism" as
determined by Kanner's criteria, and "childhood schizophrenia"
as measured by Rimland's Form E-2, and about "cognitive
skills" as quantified in terms of the categories described
in this study. We are not making statements which necessari-
ly can be generalized to autism, childhood schizophrenia, or
cognition in more abstract senses.
Implications of These Findings for Diagnosis and Prognosis
The finding that diagnosis (autism or schizophrenia) is
statistically related to prognosis (outcome in late child-
hood) supports the value of using the Kanner-Rimland criteria
to make these diagnoses. The child psychiatrist, clinical
psychologist, psychiatric social work therapist, or—increas-
ingly—special educator who is called upon to advise parents
concerning planning for a very disturbed child can begin an
assessment by gathering the information needed to make the
differential diagnosis.
Kanner's five criteria are: profound withdrawal of con-
tact from people, obsessive desire for sameness, skillful re-
lation to objects, retention of intelligent and pensive phy-
siognomy, and mutism or language which does not serve inter-
personal communication. These criteria, while seemingly
straightforward, actually call for careful observation and
weighing of information. An evaluator should have had super-
vised experience with autistic children before attempting to
use these criteria to make a firm diagnosis. Certainly, he
cannot gather this information from the parents over the
telephone! Rimland's checklist is intended to be filled out
by parents and then to be scored by a person trained in its
use. The checklist is quite long but contains crucial dif-
ferentiating items, several of them similar to the Kanner
criteria for identifying autism which would serve to dis-
tinguish between an autistic and a schizophrenic child.
Although the prognosis for autistic children as a group
is bleak, it is known that some quite disturbed classically,
autistic children do attain normal or nearly normal adult
levels of functioning (see, for example; Bosch, 1970; Brown,
197*0. On the other hand, some children with very early ap-
pearing childhood schizophrenia fail to progress development-
ally to normal intellectual levels of functioning. The sec-
ond finding of this study, that children with a broad range
of cognitive skills in the preschool years have a hopeful
prognosis, while children with quite limited functioning have
a less optimistic prognosis, can help the evaluator to focus
on the particular child ' s potential outcome.
A standard instrument for intellectual assessment of
preschool children can be used to gain an understanding of
the breadth of the child's cognitive skills. Note that the
absolute cooperation of the child is not necessary and that
2,9
the I.Q. score per se Is not the significant piece of infor-
mation. Many of the children in this study were not "test-
able" in the sense of being able to respond to each item
presented to them on the Stanford-Binet
. Often the examiner
coaxed the child to respond, by presenting the material and
then setting it aside, and noting the child's behavior with-
out direct watching in order to avoid the close attention to
which these children are so sensitive. The ability to per-
form tasks requiring different cognitive modalities is con-
sidered the significant factor.
Those children who were assessed high on both Rimland's
Childhood Schizophrenia criteria and Kanner's Childhood Au-
tism criteria were excluded from this study. Apparently these
two systems are not absolutely mutually exclusive. This
study did not compare subjects on the basis of Rimland's cri-
teria only, since it seemed that the selection of subjects on
the basis of Kanner's criteria would result in a more soundly
selected group. The Rimland group was based on rater scor-
ings, which were not considered as valid as the sample of
parent scorings available for a small sub-group. The evalua-
tor might use Rimland's E-2 to make a differentiation. It is
not known whether the outcome predictions made from this
study would be applicable in that case. However, the use of
the concept of breadth of cognitive skills would be applic-
able. In cases where the Rimland and Kanner criteria seem to
be in contradiction, prognosis could be based more certainly
on assessment of cognitive strengths
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Importance of Language to Complex Cognitive Functioning
The results of this study lend empirical support to
clinical wisdom accumulated through experience with psychotic
children. Typically this is summarized: "If the child
doesn't talk by year five, the prognosis is quite grave."
The importance of language to continuing development is shown
indirectly by the results of this study. The children were
most able to perform those Stanford-Binet tasks that did not
depend on verbal mediation. These tasks were given descrip-
tive categories for the purposes of codifying the cognitive
data: Fine Motor Skills, Simple Perception, Rote Memory, and
Perceptual Analysis and Synthesis. Each of these categories
contains at least one task which can be performed without us-
ing language or verbal abstraction. A child who gained a
score of one, two, or three in cognitive skills almost cer-
tainly completed three of those four items. Any child who
scored higher than four in cognitive skills had to use lang-
uage in some manner.
Many people who have worked with autistic young children
have been struck by the apparent intelligence, even brilli-
ance which they seem to bring to bear on solving certain
life-tasks. Phenomenal spatial memory is reported, often in
support of the autistic child's well known antipathy to
changes in his spatial environment. A keen sense of spatial
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relations is shown by preschool autistic children who dump
out Jig-saw puzzles too difficult for their normal peers, and
solve them wrong-side-up, so that no cues from the picture
content are visible. A child I have described elsewhere
(Marx, 1974) showed a sense of harmony and interest in ex-
ploring chords and intervals at the age of four, at a time
when she was just beginning to speak a few words. Some chil-
dren who have no effective use of language for communication
learn nursery rhymes, television jingles, poetry—whatever
words are repeated to them—but in a parrot-like fashion.
A unitary, quantitative concept of intelligence would
lead one to hope that this kind of ability would serve as
the basis for intellectual growth. A child who is "brilliant"
at two (solves many spatial and motor tasks) should continue
to be bright or at least not retarded at twelve. However,
continued normal development demands the emergence of new
strengths. The ability to use language is apparently a more
important skill which emerges relatively late in the child's
development and becomes perfected over many years.
Humankind has made such extensive use of language that
its use has become almost synonymous with human existence.
"Cogito, ergo sum" probably means "I think in words, ..."
As more and more use is required of verbal ability to meet
the demands of normal existence for the human child, the
child who does not have access to language falls further and
further behind.
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The Importance of Cognition to Emotional Growth
Understanding is important to a sense of safety and well
being. Changes become predictable, even controllable, when
one understands the abstractions which govern the change.
Seasons, death, destruction by fire, disappearance and reap-
pearance of family members, and other changes are important
issues for preschool children. They learn not to be terri-
fied of these by the mediation of language. The predictabil-
ity of the seasons and the signs of change, holiday rituals
which are enjoyable, soothing images of grandfather "in hea-
ven," experiences with fire which show and explain how it can
be tame as well as destructive, stories about daddy's job,
brother's school, etc. are the curriculum of a normal pre-
schooler's development. The autistic child may have suffici-
ent awareness of the world and the way it works to develop as
much anxiety about its dangers as does the normal child. We
learn from autistic children, when they do learn to talk, that
many of their rituals and preoccupations were designed to
ward off dangers and destruction. But they do not have the
ability to communicate these fears clearly to others so that
their caretakers can reassure them. And even the very sensi-
tive adult, who may suspect what the fear might be, must use
non-verbal means to communicate the reassurance. Play ther-
apy becomes especially important. This can be very diffi-
cult, and for some sorts of fear reassurance is impossible.
The bright but non-verbal child can be left with fears which
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he cannot learn to control as normal children do. He must
instead use physical avoidance, control his frightening en-
vironment with temper tantrums or urgent demonstrations, and
then try to turn off his mind when he recognizes fears which
he cannot control by other means.
The Implications for Treatment of Very Disturbed Children
It seems clear that, if language is essential to the
healthy development of very young children, language acquisi-
tion should be given a very high priority in the education of
children who do not seem
-to be acquiring it at a normal rate.
Especially if the children seem to be psychotic, emphasis
should be placed on teaching them techniques for communicat-
ing with other people, no matter what those techniques might
be, as long as they work.
Some psychotic children who fail to attend to spoken
words respond to the same message if sung. Some seem to pick
up sign language. A few psychotic children have learned to
read and write although they did not learn spoken words. Oft-
en the use of verbal communication comes to psychotic children
after they have learned one of these non-verbal means. It
should not be argued (as has been done in the case of using
signing for deaf children) that the child should be made to
learn to communicate like other people. This goal may not be
directly attainable, and time cannot be lost waiting and hop-
ing for a breakthrough. The breakthrough may indeed come
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after the substitute form of communication has been learned.
At the same time that a cognitive educational program
is being developed for the psychotic child emphasizing commu-
nication skills, emotional support should be offered. It
should be assumed that the child was born with the same emo-
tional needs and fears as other very young children. Even if
the child seems bizarre, remote, fearless, apathetic, etc.,
these behaviors may be masks of fear. Songs, stories, drama-
tic play which touches on the important developmental issues
of the preschool years should be included in the psychotic
child's life and presented in whatever mode best communicates
to the child.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
*
Data have been presented from James Jackson Putnam Chil-
dren's Center, showing that the prognosis for preschool psy-
chotic children is more positive for Rimland-Schizophrenic
than for Kanner-Autistic children. Prognosis is also better
for children who have a broad range of cognitive skills, es-
pecially including language, than for those with a narrow
range of cognitive skills.
These data support the recommendation that the diagnos-
tician not only make a psychiatric diagnosis, but also assess
the ability of the child to use language. Recommendations
for treatment would then include plans for the acquisition of
skills which would foster communication between the child and
others
.
In view of the handicap in using language and understand-
ing abstraction special attention should be paid by a thera-
pist or educator to meeting the child's need to understand
and gain mastery over those important questions which are the
basis for young children's emotional development. Such issues
as the integrity of the body, separation from caretakers, body
functions, death, and seasonal changes should be dealt with in
the education of these children, as they are in the normal
home and pre-school. But these issues must be explained in
a manner which the child with his handicaps can understand.
Initial prognosis would rest on the psychiatric diagno-
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sis, language, and communicative skills, and on the ability
of the child's family and comity to provide supportive and
remedial care. Later evaluations would take special account
of language and/or communication skills acquisition.
57
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w c- Card 6 7
J J . Strongest area
1* Fine motor alone fTn
2. Simple perception. hoTJ^T/ f"« W1S <= «*»».!>Di S crimlMtion of Animal Pictures m a' m" ^ ?0al '
3 Rote
3 IV) F
"' ,H 0 1 Dlscrll»ination
4. Perceptual analysis and syXst ° (dT^ ?' XI)III-6, Square V, Diamond VI SL^T 111 > Cross III.
6 cube pyramid; Patience Pictures Si 6 V ? Pyramid ni «Patience Rectangle V p.,„„ r It ' ComP l«ion of Man V;
WiSC: Block lestgn, Picture Ar^"
8 IX
''
B1 °Ck Countln8 ^
5. Perceptual reasoning and'exp v Assembly)
Picture Absurdities VII- wisp!T f *• (l',utlli":co Pictures VI;
6. Receptive language and Perce "on ' ^ P r" ffi .
7. Expressive laneuaee Inrf"
Corr,mlsslons Maze Tracing VI.->
ResptTco P?cturer^l!05.
(Pi"U"
" StoVvni^na^^rtb 8 S— Memory for
9. Receptive and ' ?f
the Week VI1I
=
«S C: Information)
IV, iv-6 VI I VI IT
&TSV reaSOnln8- (Comprehension IH-6,
Vocabulary V X mm!*
1
"
"ir™?' VI1; **t
Absurdities VIII li Rhf rt* ZYl S^rities VII, VIII;
-WISC- vlttl i ' J ' V °
S 1X1 Findins Reasons X;
10 Aritmeti „„ £
Cabulary
"
Similarities-, Comprehension.)
^ISc
nAmritmetic;PtS -^ ^ Ch-se IX;
11. Not enough performance to score
Second strongest area: 1-11 above
13. Weakest area
1. Receptive language (#6)
2. Expressive language (#7)
3. 1 + 2
4. Perceptual analysis and synthesis (#4)
5. Aritmetic, number concepts (#10)
7* itlllltt
reaSOn
]
ng 0n m^erial with emotionally neutral content
/. Abstrac reasoning on material with emotionally charged content
8. 6 + 7
35 MutilaCed Pictures, Absurdities, some of Comp. VII)
9. Fine motor
10. Other
11. Not enough performance to score
.
Second weakest area: 1-11 above
-47- Card 6
Kanncr 1 s Early Infantile Autism
3*. Profound withdrawal of contact from people
1.. highly char. +3 ?
2. somewhat char, +1
3« not char. -2
Obsessive desire for the preservation of sameness
1. highly char. +3
2. somewhat char. +1
3. not char. -2
Skillful relation to objects
1. highly char. +3
2. somewhat char. 4-1
3. not char. -2
HI. Retention of intelligent and pensive physiognomy
1. highly char. +3
2. somewhat char. +1
3. not char. -2
Mutism or the kind of language that does not seem intended to serve the
^3. Total Early Infantile Autism score (Range -10 to +15)
1. -10 to -8
2. -7 to-5
3. -4 to -2
4. -1 to +1
5. +2 to 44
6. +5 to +7
7. +8 to +10
8. +11 to +13
.9. +14, +15
Treatment Variables
»
4^. Child's age at first professional contact (Except pediatrician unless
he makes the diagnosis)
1. 0 to 1-11
2. 2 to 2-11
3. 3 to 3-11
4. 4 to 4-11
5. 5 to 5-11 •)
6. 6+
4£ Child's' age at beginning of treatment
1. less than 2 years
2. 2 to 2-5
3. 2-6 to 2-11
4. 3-0 to 3-5
5. 3-6 to 3-11
6. 4-0 to 4-5
7. 4-6 to 4-11
purpose of interpersonal communication
1. highly char. +3
2. somewhat char. +1
3. not char.
-X
8. 5-0 to 6-0
9. 6+
car-d 7
24. Kimland^cale score (rater rated)
2! 15-20
3. * 9-14
4. 3-8
5. -3 to +2
6.. -9 to -4
7. -15 to -10
8. -21 to -16
9. -22+
2* Rimland scale score (parent rated)(1-9 as in #24) 1
26. Age of child when parent filled ou, Rimland scale1. less tnan one year from nmo^ii-T •
2. 1-2 years from aonli>*?^PRation interview age0 or- : t ^yiicauion interview a^e3. 3-5 years from application interview fee5. 5-10 years from application interview f™
1 nT^Me10 yeaPS £ft- Wllc^TlSSrvlaW
27. Rimland scale speech score (rater rated)
1. -r 7 or above 1
2. 0 to +6
3. -1 to -9
28. Rimland scale speech score (parent rated)(1-3 as in #27) J
fe£E£2ion^
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e.a. 3-8
I first met ife-ni ?« 3/25/68
Plate^^ it on his^ fgaUy
toktaS that contestfSi?^,^n ey2s » fi«**y chiseled feat,ntra ts w th his fair skin. He mows at a f^es . Glti thick
MTtar. 1 B*« , - L d -Little 102.
T^^^M^m.: On the Stanford pire* test h* n» , *.s block teidgS i^Hpicture vocoHu^^^.,- Passed two tests at yr. mdiscrimination of ball,, pawnee ^iG ^^ scored at ™ didton,, at 17 and parsed pictorialidSSSto^*^Ba^' He ^^iminatedMeOTi**ea ion. Hidden objects were recalled.
ifSFLSS^l KSug^SS P^ted by his distance but'of forms and pictorial idcni&Ieation t t3 a*?ve his discriminationby his button sorting. Autocritical ** COOi^tion is good judging
matching test where he n4deTsDon?L^f,f^! "ff exercised on the animal
8 8
appears to b* in keepinTwith his a^e
correction
- "is formal vocabulary
A slender boy with deep sot brown eyas and chiseled ftafrm.. uUttle jog, He speaks spontaneously as he did S ?J fJf at aroom but his voice tended to he , ff ha formality of the nursery
demurred at eating hii iSV-h LS, r^,^11 tensl°n- He hod
the testing situ^ioTwhSe he^2^°ijf! t0 MG mother and this ™3 true in
stringing and copy of a circle bT u5?fr' 5° C01B Gently refused beadbridge iSitatively. * He 2bowm£S ^If? to Sovt buttoRS and build a block
and digit repetition. Ite SSSS^^ 1?^ vocabula2^ refusing pictures
of forms end' pictorial ^nSISSL* Sf"?* for aninal etching, discrimination
eoaxing $fTh^ meSS to » K£ Jk. fV^S beeonB ^reasingly resistant andi i..- ocner go, he ran the engine about the room. With the promise
-2- it
c.a. 3*8
(Mrs, Young)
3/25/68
of soins ho did cooperate on hidden objects recalled.
^^^^ well with* his
resistance, his reticence respectefby hIfrao?h^r/ ^ With
eb

